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What Is Standard Tomorrow, May Not 
Have Been Today: An Argument For 
Claiming Scènes à Faire 
LOGAN SANDLER* 
 Recent lawsuits involving the Pirates of the Caribbean 
film franchise and the Oscar award-winning movie The 
Shape of Water required courts to wrestle with the applica-
tion of the decisive scènes à faire doctrine. In doing so, the 
Ninth Circuit exposed the doctrine’s chief pitfall: the lack of 
a temporal framework. 
The modern scènes à faire doctrine limits the scope of 
what authors can claim as substantially similar by excluding 
the standard or stock elements in a given expressive work 
from copyright protection. Courts will often conclude that a 
contested element is scènes à faire if it can be demonstrated 
that certain themes, events, or settings in question belong to 
a certain genre. To measure what may fall within the scope 
of unprotected stock, a court focuses on supplementary fac-
tors such as the public’s perception of genre conventions, 
which are culturally dependent and drastically evolve over 
time. 
However, many courts fail to consider “timing” when 
applying the scènes à faire doctrine. Courts do not neces-
sarily evaluate whether certain aspects or elements within a 
work were “standard or stock” when the copyrighted mate-
rial was created. For that reason, an infringing work that 
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becomes popular may use the scènes à faire doctrine as a 
sword against what was once original singular expression. 
This inequitable scenario could arise if the scènes à faire 
doctrine is applied to a work at the commencement of litiga-
tion and not at the time of the work’s original drafting. 
 In reasoning that courts should focus a scènes à faire 
inquiry from the perspective of the writer at the time that the 
copyrighted material was written, this Comment explores 
the claiming systems of patent law with a view toward how 
they may remedy the scènes à faire doctrine’s shortcomings. 
To rectify the doctrine’s inadequacies, primarily within the 
context of screenplays and teleplays, this Comment ulti-
mately proposes an author-drafted copyright registration 
supplement that details the intricacies of how a genre’s con-
ventions were implemented in a work at the time of creation 
through plot, character, theme, and setting, among other 
things.  
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INTRODUCTION 
[I]n Hollywood, as in the life of men generally, there 
is only rarely anything new under the sun. 
     —Judge Joseph T. Sneed III1 
 
On July 22, 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
resuscitated a copyright infringement claim brought by two screen-
writers who alleged that the Walt Disney Company copied their pi-
rate-themed screenplay to create the first Pirates of the Caribbean 
 
 1 Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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film.2 Previously, the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California found that much of the works’ similarities 
were unprotectable scènes à faire elements because the resem-
blances were “familiar stock scenes, and characteristics that flow 
naturally from the works’ shared basic plot premise” within the pi-
rate genre.3 In support of its reversal and remand, the appellate panel 
found that the district court prematurely determined that the shared 
elements amidst the two works were unprotectable scènes à faire 
common to pirate stories.4 Under the scènes à faire doctrine, courts 
will not protect elements like stock characters or standard elements 
for the genre of the work in question.5 
Because the work in question was approximately twenty years 
old and the “Pirates of the Caribbean film franchise may itself have 
shaped what are now considered pirate-movie tropes,”6 an important 
question arises: at what point in time should courts apply the scènes 
à faire doctrine?7 At the time of the work’s creation, at the moment 
of alleged infringement, or at the time of the suit’s commencement? 
If the scènes à faire doctrine is applied to the literary work at the 
time of litigation and not at the time of the work’s original drafting, 
a copyrighted work could lose its value and protection upon a po-
tentially infringing work becoming “successful and widely 
adopted.”8 To be sure, the Ninth Circuit’s decision provides little 
 
 2 See Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 821 F. App’x 727 (9th Cir. 2020). On Sep-
tember 7, 2021, Defendant Walt Disney Pictures filed its Motion for Summary 
Judgment. See Defendant Walt Disney Pictures’ Notice of Motion and Motion for 
Summary Judgment Re Substantial Similarity, Alfred, II et al. v. Walt Disney 
Pictures, No. 2:18-CV-08074-CBM-Asx (C.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2021). At the time of 
this Comment’s publication, Judge Consuelo B. Marshall had yet to issue a final 
decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment.  
 3 See Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 388 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1183 (C.D. Cal. 
2019). 
 4 See Alfred, 821 F. App’x at 729 (indicating that at the pleading stage of 
litigation, “it is difficult to know whether such elements are indeed unprotectible 
material” and that “[a]dditional evidence would help inform the question of sub-
stantial similarity”). 
 5 See id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See Dale Cendali, Litigating Scènes À Faire, 43 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 415, 
418 (2020). 
 8 Krista S. Schwartz et al., Software and Scènes à Faire, COPYRIGHT WORLD 
11, 12 (2009). 
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direction to district courts in adjudicating future infringement claims 
where temporal issues of such significance may arise. 
Although a screenwriter may justifiably conclude that their 
screenplay or teleplay has been pilfered, proving this belief in a 
court of law can be an arduous and costly endeavor.9 As a threshold 
matter, copyright law solely protects the “expression of ideas, not 
the ideas themselves.”10 While utterly complete originality may not 
necessarily exist, “[t]his distinction [between protected expressions 
and unprotected ideas] is at the essence” of many copyright infringe-
ment claims.11 
To prove copyright infringement, screenwriters must prove that 
they had copyright ownership and that the alleged infringer had ac-
cess to the work, while additionally demonstrating substantial simi-
larity between the two screenplays.12 Typically, such copyright in-
fringement actions end with a pretrial ruling maintaining that the 
litigant-writer failed to show substantial similarity as a matter of 
law.13 For this reason, the “meat and potatoes” of screenplay litiga-
tion is substantial similarity.14 Enveloped within the determination 
of substantial similarity is the scènes à faire doctrine, which is un-
derstood to be one of the chief barriers that a writer-turned-plaintiff 
faces when attempting to demonstrate substantial similarity between 
works.15 
The modern scènes à faire doctrine limits the scope of what au-
thors may claim by excluding the standard or stock elements in a 
given expressive work from copyright protection.16 Correspond-
ingly, the doctrine precludes stock and standard elements, standing 
 
 9 Nick Gladden, When California Dreamin’ Becomes a Hollywood Night-
mare; Copyright Infringement and the Motion Picture Screenplay: Toward an 
Improved Framework, 10 UNIV. GA. J. INTELL. PROP. L. 359, 360 (2003). 
 10 Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Fa-
miliar stock scenes and themes that are staples of literature are not protected.”). 
 11 Richard H. Jones, The Myth of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copy-
right Law, 10 PACE L. REV. 551, 552 (1990). 
 12 See Gladden, supra note 9, at 360. 
 13 Robert F. Helfing, Substantial Similarity in Literary Infringement Cases: 
A Chart for Turbid Waters, 21 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2014). 
 14 Gladden, supra note 9, at 360. 
 15 Id. at 375. 
 16 Robert Kirk Walker, Breaking with Convention: The Conceptual Failings 
of Scenes A Faire, 38 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 435, 436 (2020). 
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alone, from successfully supporting a copyright infringement 
claim.17 For instance, the average audience member likely expects 
that at the conclusion of a Hollywood detective film, the identity of 
the wrongdoer will be discovered. For all practical purposes, these 
necessary scenes or events that are so-called scènes à faire have be-
come unprotectable ideas in their own right by virtue of their indis-
pensable character.18  
Similarly, situations and incidents that flow naturally from a 
basic plot idea are rendered scènes à faire and cannot normally sus-
tain an infringement claim.19 For example, in Williams v. Crichton, 
a finding of infringement could not be sustained since “the common 
elements of electrified fences, automated tours, dinosaur nurseries, 
and uniformed workers were scenes-a-faire that flowed from the 
concept of a dinosaur zoo.”20 Like the merger doctrine and the idea-
expression distinction, courts have yet to develop a surefire test to 
differentiate between protectable, original expression and unpro-
tected stock elements and characters; but, unlike the merger doctrine 
and the idea-expression distinction, the scènes à faire doctrine has 
received minute consideration from legal scholars.21 
What is more—the scènes à faire doctrine shifts a court’s focus 
to use ancillary factors such as the public’s perception of genre con-
ventions,22 which are culturally dependent and drastically evolve 
over time,23 to measure what may fall within the scope of unpro-
tected stock.24 However, many courts fail to consider “timing” alto-
gether when applying the scènes à faire doctrine.25 Specifically, 
courts do not necessarily evaluate whether certain aspects or 
 
 17 Id. 
 18 Gavin M. Strube, Comment, Gotham Skylines: The Intersection of Scènes 
à Faire and Fictional Facts in Comic Books, Graphic Novels, and their Derivative 
Works, 5 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L. F. 54, 64–65 (2015). 
 19 Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293–94 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 20 Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 
Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 21 Walker, supra note 16, at 435. 
 22 Don M. Tamura, Comment, Copyright Infringement: An Argument for the 
Elimination of the Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 5 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 147, 
161 (1982). 
 23 Walker, supra note 16, at 438. 
 24 See id. at 457. 
 25 See, e.g., Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 388 F. Supp. 3d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 
2019). 
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elements within a screenplay or teleplay were “standard or stock” 
when the copyrighted material was written.26 As explained further 
herein,27 the lack of a consistent temporal framework not only frus-
trates the incentives for creating original works, but also results in 
misunderstanding and repeated misapplication of the scènes à faire 
doctrine in literary copyright infringement cases.28 The Supreme 
Court has concluded that “[t]he sine qua non of copyright is origi-
nality,” and “[t]o qualify for copyright protection, a work must be 
original to the author.”29 To be consistent with this tenet, a court’s 
scènes à faire inquiry must examine the “originality” of a screenplay 
or teleplay at the time of the work’s creation because gauging orig-
inality necessitates an accurate perspective of the creator at the mo-
ment of creation—not at a construed moment in the past or future.30 
A similar quandary to the circumstances in Alfred v. Walt Disney 
Co. presented itself in a lawsuit concerning the Academy Award-
winning film The Shape of Water. There, the estate of Paul Zindel 
alleged that Director Guillermo del Toro plagiarized Paul Zindel’s 
1969 play Let Me Hear You Whisper.31 Both The Shape of Water 
and Zindel’s play concerned plots centered on an aquatic creature 
imprisoned in a science research laboratory. In June 2020, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the “district court 
erred by dismissing the action because, at this stage, reasonable 
minds could differ on whether there is substantial similarity between 
Let Me Hear You Whisper and The Shape of Water.”32 Notably, the 
opinion provided that further evidence would “illuminate whether 
any similarities are mere unprotectable literary tropes or scènes à 
 
 26 See also Schwartz et. al, supra note 8, at 12 (“The absence of an analytical 
framework including a logical temporal component has resulted in confusion and 
frequent misapplication of the scènes à faire doctrine in computer software copy-
right cases.”). 
 27 See infra Part III. 
 28 See Schwartz et. al, supra note 8, at 12. 
 29 Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 30 Cf. Cendali, supra note 7, at 418. 
 31 Plaintiff-Appellant David Zindel’s Opening Brief, at 2 Zindel v. Fox 
Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 815 F. App’x 158 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 18-56087), 2018 
WL 6681697, at *1. 
 32 Zindel v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 815 F. App’x 158, 160 (9th Cir. 
2020). 
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faire.”33 Earlier, in 2018, the district court dismissed the case, find-
ing any similarities among the works “too general to be protected.”34 
The Ninth Circuit, however, did not indicate if it would be 
proper to evaluate whether the similarities found in Let Me Hear You 
Whisper were standard, stock, or common at the time when Zindel 
authored the play. Because the play was written roughly fifty-one 
years ago, an accurate and equitable scènes à faire analysis of the 
alleged similarities should look to what was generalized stock 
within this subject at the time of creation in 1969. On April 2, 2021, 
after more than three years of litigation, the parties stipulated that 
the action be dismissed with prejudice.35 The matter was set for a 
July 2021 trial date.36 Although Zindel’s estate purportedly agreed 
to dismiss the case, the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Zindel v. Fox 
Searchlight Pictures, Inc. and Alfred v. Walt Disney Co. confirm not 
only the significance of the scènes à faire doctrine for plaintiffs at-
tempting to prove improper infringement, but also that the doctrine’s 
temporal framework must be reformed. 
Though some argue that the scènes à faire doctrine should be 
eliminated altogether,37 this Comment proposes that an improved 
copyright registration system can more adequately and successfully 
guide courts through the necessary measure of the scènes à faire 
doctrine. With the goal of decreasing frivolous or lengthy litigation, 
while protecting expression through evidentiary assurance, this 
Comment will demonstrate that copyright law can be reasonably 
tweaked by adding supportive claiming elements reminiscent of pa-
tent law to clarify the author’s inspiration, intention, and under-
standing of a given genre as it relates to the plot, theme, mood, set-
ting, pace, and characters in his or her work.38 To that end, this Com-
ment will also maintain that to ascertain whether the scènes à faire 
 
 33 Id. 
 34 Zindel v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. CV18-1435 PA (KSx), 2018 
WL 3601842, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2018). 
 35 Stipulation For Dismissal with Prejudice at 2–3, Zindel, 815 F. App’x 158 
(No. 2:18-CV-01435-PA-KS). 
 36 Zach Sharf, ‘Shape of Water’ Plagiarism Lawsuit Dismissed: Guillermo 
del Toro Is the ‘True Creator’, INDIEWIRE (Apr. 5, 2021, 11:45 AM), https:/
/www.indiewire.com/2021/04/shape-of-water-plagiarism-lawsuit-dismissed-
guillermo-del-toro-1234627996/. 
 37 See, e.g., Tamura, supra note 22, at 149. 
 38 See infra Part V. 
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doctrine precludes copyright protection for a literary work and a dra-
matic work, courts should assess the debated material from two an-
gles: (1) from the point of view of the author of the copyrighted ma-
terial and (2) based on other widely known works existing at the 
time the copyrighted work was created or written.39 This assessment 
not only advances both the policy and economic aims of copyright 
protection, but also requires courts to examine the originality of the 
author’s work against the prevailing genre tropes existing when the 
work was written.40 
Part II succinctly outlines the necessary elements of an action 
for copyright infringement and what a plaintiff must prove in order 
to prevail. In addition, Part II will illustrate how U.S. courts today 
apply the scènes à faire doctrine. Part III discusses the deficiencies 
inherent in the scènes à faire doctrine in light of the circumstances 
in Alfred v. Walt Disney Co. Part III also assesses the potential im-
plications of a scènes à faire analysis that evaluates whether the dis-
puted work was original or whether it was standard or stock when 
the author, namely screenwriters, penned the screenplay or teleplay. 
Part IV explores the modern claiming systems of U.S. patent law 
and examines its underlying policies as a means of ascertaining their 
applicability for copyrighting literary and dramatic works, primarily 
through the lens of screenplays and teleplays, as these kinds of 
works are the fictional forms where the scenes à faire doctrine is 
most commonly invoked.41 Part V resolves said issues, in part by 
utilizing patent law claiming systems and applying it to the scènes à 
faire doctrine’s shortcomings. In doing so, this Comment will 
demonstrate how the proposed claiming framework will aide a 
court’s application of the substantial similarity test—a test that has 
evolved to “create[] a confusing and ineffectual body of law . . . .”42 
 
 39 Schwartz et. al, supra note 8, at 12 (establishing parallel test in the context 
of computer software copyright infringement cases). 
 40 See id. (“[T]he purpose of the Copyright Clause is to reward an author’s 
original creation.”). 
 41 See generally Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of 
the Scenes a Faire and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 
779 (2006); Torrean Edwards, Scènes à Faire in Music: How an Old Defense is 
Maturing, and How it Can Be Improved, 23 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 105, 
108 (2019) (indicating that the scènes à faire doctrine was “traditionally reserved 
for literature, stage works, and later film . . . ”). 
 42 Helfing, supra note 13, at 3. 
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Finally, the Conclusion will offer closing thoughts regarding the fu-
ture of screenplay and teleplay litigation, while dually suggesting 
what writers can do to protect themselves in the immediate future. 
II. CONNECTING PRINCIPLES OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT TO 
THE SCÈNES À FAIRE DOCTRINE 
A. Copyright Infringement 
Copyright protection is intended to stimulate creativity and the 
distribution of creative works so that society may benefit from the 
efforts of authors.43 The major policy purpose underlying the copy-
right system is the belief “that if protection were absent, then unau-
thorized reproduction would impair the economic interest of the au-
thor and curtail creation of new works.”44 And so, copyright law 
incentivizes authors to create new works by giving authors “the ex-
clusive right to profit from and control specified uses of their 
works.”45 For our purposes, a motion picture screenplay, teleplay, 
or novel is a “writing” within the import of the Copyright Clause.46 
Since direct evidence of copying rarely exists,47 courts will “in-
fer” copying when a plaintiff shows that the alleged infringer had 
access to the plaintiff’s work and created a product that was substan-
tially similar to that work.48 In addition to these two requirements, 
copyright ownership for that work must be proved; however, this 
element is a “statutory formality easily satisfied prior to the 
 
 43 Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scenes A Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 
79, 83 (1989). 
 44 Tamura, supra note 22, at 149. 
 45 Kurtz, supra note 43, at 83; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (providing the set of 
exclusive rights in copyrighted works). 
 46 See Gladden, supra note 9, at 361; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 47 Edwards, supra note 41, at 105. 
 48 Steven G. McKnight, Substantial Similarity Between Video Games: An Old 
Copyright Problem in a New Medium, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1277, 1280 (1983). 
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institution of litigation.”49 As previously mentioned, substantial 
similarity is often the crucial issue in copyright infringement litiga-
tion.50 
To determine whether works are indeed substantially similar, 
courts tackle two main types of analysis. First, courts must demar-
cate the scope of a plaintiff’s copyright to establish what a defendant 
may or may not copy.51 Second, courts must weigh the defendant’s 
work against the plaintiff’s protectable expression to determine 
whether they are substantially similar.52 
Vital to the initial determination of scope is the idea-expression 
distinction, which provides “that copyright laws protect only expres-
sions of ideas, not the abstract ideas underlying a copyrighted 
work.”53 The expression of a creative work is therefore the only 
facet subject to monopoly control, whereas “‘ideas’ may always be 
freely borrowed.”54 In other words, copyright law “protects origi-
nality in the means of expression.”55 This principle consequently 
“depends upon the distinguishability of the idea from its expres-
sion.”56 While the line separating idea and expression is not well-
defined,57 strong trends have materialized within the screenplay and 
teleplay context regarding what constitutes substantial similarity, 
predominantly within the elements of character, plot, mood, and 
 
 49 Stephanie J. Jones, Music Copyright in Theory and Practice: An Improved 
Approach for Determining Substantial Similarity, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 277, 277 
(1993); see also 17 U.S.C. § 411 (setting forth the statutory requirement that reg-
istration must be made before an action for copyright infringement is initiated). 
 50 See, e.g., Smith v. AMC Networks, Inc., No. 18-CV-03803-LHK, 2019 
WL402360, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2019) (“Analysis of . . . ‘substantial similar-
ity’ between the works—is the crux of Defendants’ motion to dismiss.”). 
 51 McKnight, supra note 48, at 1280. 
 52 See generally Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir. 
2001) (“The standard test for substantial similarity between two items is whether 
an ‘ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed 
to overlook them, and regard [the] aesthetic appeal as the same.’”). E.g., Williams 
v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1996) (demonstrating that in the “novel and 
movie” context courts “examine the similarities in such aspects as the total con-
cept and feel, theme, characters, plot, sequence, pace, and setting . . . “) 
 53 McKnight, supra note 48, at 1280. 
 54 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 150 F.2d 612, 612 (2d. Cir 1945). 
 55 Leon R. Yankwich, Legal Protection of Ideas—A Judge’s Approach, 43 
VA. L. REV. 375, 378 (1957). 
 56 McKnight, supra note 48, at 1281. 
 57 Gladden, supra note 9, at 362. 
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theme.58 With regards to television and film scripts, general con-
cepts and ideas associated with these elements are uncopyrightable, 
but the particular expression of those ideas is copyrightable.59 For 
example, in Berkic v. Crichton, the Ninth Circuit rejected finding 
substantial similarity based on familiar stocks scenes such as “de-
pictions of the small miseries of domestic life, romantic frolics at 
the beach, and conflicts between ambitious young people on one 
hand, and conservative or evil bureaucracies on the other.”60 
In the Ninth Circuit, courts often employ the Krofft “extrinsic-
intrinsic” filtration test to facilitate an accurate sorting of protectable 
and unprotectable elements.61 The intrinsic test, which scrutinizes 
“an ordinary person’s subjective impressions of the similarities be-
tween two works[,]” is exclusively the jury’s domain.62 The extrin-
sic test, employed by courts at the motion to dismiss and summary 
judgement stage, is “objective in nature” and “focuses on ‘articula-
ble similarities between the plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, 
pace, characters, and sequence of events.’”63 When employing the 
extrinsic test, courts “must filter out and disregard the non-protecti-
ble elements in making its substantial similarity determination.”64 
When the plaintiff’s argument is based on the overall selection 
and sequencing of unprotectable similarities, the presence of many 
scènes à faire elements may satisfy a court’s application of the ex-
trinsic test.65 In implementing what is known as the “selection and 
arrangement test,” the Ninth Circuit has equally specified that “[i]t 
is entirely immaterial that, in many respects, plaintiff’s and defend-
ant’s works are dissimilar, if in other respects, similarity as to a 
 
 58 Id. at 366. 
 59 See id. at 371. 
 60 See 761 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1985) (“These familiar scenes and 
themes are among the very staples of modern American literature and film.”). 
 61 Gladden, supra note 9, at 366. 
 62 Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Ent. Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822–23 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“Scenes-a-faire, or situations and incidents that flow necessarily or naturally 
from a basic plot premise, cannot sustain a finding of infringement.”). 
 65 Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1060, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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substantial element of plaintiff’s work can be shown.”66 Metcalf v. 
Bochco offers an informative example of what is necessary for the 
selection and arrangement of generic or scènes à faire elements in a 
narrative work to establish substantial similarity.67 The Metcalf 
court assessed a claim concerning a treatment68 entitled Give Some-
thing Back and the CBS television series City of Angels.69 There, the 
court described the unprotectable similarities as striking: 
Both the Metcalf and Bochco works are set in over-
burdened county hospitals in inner-city Los Angeles 
with mostly black staffs. Both deal with issues of 
poverty, race relations and urban blight. The works’ 
main characters are both young, good-looking, mus-
cular black surgeons who grew up in the neighbor-
hood where the hospital is located. Both surgeons 
struggle to choose between the financial benefits of 
private practice and the emotional rewards of work-
ing in the inner city. Both are romantically involved 
with young professional women when they arrive at 
the hospital, but develop strong attractions to hospi-
tal administrators. Both new relationships flourish 
and culminate in a kiss, but are later strained when 
the administrator observes a display of physical inti-
macy between the main character and his original 
love interest. Both administrators are in their thirties, 
were once married but are now single, without chil-
dren and devoted to their careers and to the hospital. 
In both works, the hospital’s bid for reaccreditation 
is vehemently opposed by a Hispanic politician.70 
 
 66 L.A. Printex Indus. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 851 (9th Cir. 
2012)(citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 13.03 (B)(1)(a) (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2011). 
 67 Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1075. 
 68 Jason Hellerman, How to Write a Treatment (with Film Treatment Exam-
ples), NO FILM SCHOOL (Oct. 23, 2018), https://nofilmschool.com/film-treatment 
(“[A film treatment is a] multi-page document written in prose, that tells the story 
that happens in your screenplay. It is a synopsis, with action, sparse dialogue, and 
works as a roadmap for the reader, producer, and writer.”). 
 69 Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1072. 
 70 Id. at 1073–74. 
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Beyond merely enumerating generic elements, a plaintiff simi-
larly situated to that of the Metcalf plaintiff must contend that the 
works coordinate or arrange the scènes à faire elements in strikingly 
similar fashion to satisfy the extrinsic test and avoid dismissal or 
summary judgment.71 
B. Modern Application of the Scènes à Faire Doctrine 
As a threshold matter, a litigant will typically present scènes à 
faire evidence to the court by affixing it to the pleading or incorpo-
rating it through reference therein.72 Although courts have yet to 
squarely define the French term,73 many courts today have used the 
definition set forth in Alexander v. Haley, which provides that 
scènes à faire are “incidents, characters or settings which are as a 
practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment 
of a given topic.”74 In the literary and cinema context, this analysis 
underpins the modern scènes à faire doctrine.75 And so, after identi-
fying the pertinent distinctions amongst the incidents, characters, or 
settings—which may be “very subtle and refined, and, sometimes, 
almost evanescent”76—a court must determine whether a given 
characteristic or component is either standard to a given topic or in-
dispensable.77 A court’s determination of indispensability seeks to 
precisely ascertain whether one of the aforesaid elements naturally 
flows from a film’s genre or narrative theme or mise-en-scène.78 If 
so, any similarities are thereby inherent in the situation and are thus 
unprotectable.79 
The other threshold query asks courts to pursue an understand-
ing of whether characters or standard scenes have acquired a “level 
of cultural familiarity that their existence cannot be attributed to the 
 
 71 See id. at 1075. 
 72 Cendali, supra note 7, at 416. 
 73 Kurtz, supra note 43, at 81. 
 74 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (emphasis added). 
 75 See, e.g., Bernal v. Paradigm Talent & Literary Agency, 788 F. Supp. 2d 
1043, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 76 See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
 77 See Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Ent. Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th 
Cir. 2006). 
 78 See Kurtz, supra note 43, at 92. 
 79 Gladden, supra note 9, at 375. 
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creativity of any particular author.”80 For example, one classic 
model “is the lack of [copyright] protection in police fiction for 
‘drunks, prostitutes, vermin and derelict cars’ and ‘foot chases and 
the morale problems of policemen, not to mention the familiar figure 
of the Irish cop.’”81 Almost inevitably, these so-termed “standard” 
scenes or incidents arise in every genre.82 It is a general precept of 
copyright law that the protection of fictional works will not extend 
to stock characters or plots regularly linked to a “particular genre.”83 
In addition, courts will conclude that a contested element is scènes 
à faire if it can be demonstrated that certain themes, events, or set-
tings in question belong to a genre.84 For instance, the genre of sci-
ence fiction commonly involves unprotectable “‘stock themes,’” 
like “space travel, supernatural forces, war games, alien discovery, 
and adventuring through space.”85 
Rather vexing is how modern courts apply the scènes à faire doc-
trine, frequently determining that a given element of a work is un-
protected “without the need for explanation or supporting evi-
dence.”86 Indeed, courts are often apparently “unaware that [a] 
scènes à faire [analysis] requires them to answer complex and taxo-
nomic aesthetic questions.”87 To be sure, the scènes à faire doctrine 
demands a detailed “subjective and qualitative assessment[]”88 of 
the work in question. Support for this contention is buttressed by 
Smith v. AMC Networks, Inc. There, Judge Lucy Koh discounted the 
 
 80 Walker, supra note 16, at 452. 
 81 Gladden, supra note 9, at 375. 
 82 Kurtz, supra note 43, at 92. 
 83 See Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(“[E]lements of a work that are indispensable, or at least standard in the treatment 
of a given topic—like cowboys, bank robbers, and shootouts in stories of the 
American West—get no protection.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wil-
liams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 589 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that “electrified 
fences, automated tours, dinosaur nurseries, and uniformed workers” are standard 
scènes à faire that derive from the uncopyrightable idea of a dinosaur zoo). 
 84 Tamura, supra note 22, at 160. 
 85 See Abdin v. CBS Broad., Inc., 971 F.3d 57, 71 (2d Cir. 2020). 
 86 Walker, supra note 16, at 456. 
 87 Id. at 463. 
 88 See Robert K. Walker & Ben Depoorter, Unavoidable Aesthetic Judgments 
in Copyright Law: A Community of Practice Standard, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 343, 
346 (2015). 
392 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1 
 
array of cases89 that the defendants’ argument relied upon because 
those cases’ conclusions of scènes à faire elements “offer[ed] little 
analysis.”90  
On account of this, courts should aim to thoroughly consider and 
ascertain the legitimate creative expressive differences between 
works when applying the scènes à faire doctrine, rather than relying 
solely on the scènes à faire doctrine as a quick fix exclusionary 
checklist. The thoroughness and diligence of a court’s assessment 
would be unquestionably bolstered by an author-created informa-
tional rubric to guide judges in their analyses. It is the complexity of 
this analysis, in part, that drives the heart of this Comment’s forth-
coming proposal.91 As demonstrated infra Part V, this rubric would 
permit judges to answer the taxonomic aesthetic questions inherent 
in a scènes à faire analysis without having to rely so heavily on their 
own aesthetic judgments.92 
Akin to a valid copyright registration affording a plaintiff prima 
facie evidence of ownership,93 adding copyright claiming elements 
suggestive of patent law can provide courts with prima facie evi-
dence of a work’s genre. In practice, this would aid courts in con-
clusively determining not only what genre the work should be clas-
sified as, but additionally would, especially for genre-bending 
works, assist courts in determining what elements are in fact indis-
pensable or stock when conducting the extrinsic test. Without care 
and author guidance, judicial decisions assessing genre and/or his-
torical works under the doctrine may be subject to error or may be 
altogether impossible. This is because many filmmakers, like The 
Coen Brothers, Paul Thomas Anderson, or Quentin Tarantino, use 
easily recognizable visual and textual references—i.e., stock 
 
 89 See, e.g., Cline v. Reetz-Laoilo, 329 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 
2018); Heusey v. Emmerich, CV 14-06810-AB (Ex), 2015 WL 12765115, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. April 9, 2015); DuckHole Inc. v. NBC Universal Media LLC, No. CV 
12–10077 BRO (CWx), 2013 WL 5797279, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2013). 
 90 Smith v. AMC Networks, Inc., No. 18-CV-03803-LHK, 2019 WL 402360, 
at *6 (N.D Cal. Jan. 31, 2019). 
 91 See infra Part V. 
 92 Cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (“It 
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the nar-
rowest and most obvious limits.”). 
 93 Walker, supra note 16, at 467. 
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elements—re-contextualized for dramatic or comedic effect.94 In 
this light, a significantly greater aesthetic analysis than the scènes à 
faire standard or stock inquiry provides is needed to accurately as-
sess the expressive function of elements within a work.95 
Precision is crucial to a court’s assessment, as the motion picture 
and television business continues to rapidly evolve like never be-
fore.96 This evolution has triggered the rapid development of genre 
conventions both narratively and aesthetically. For example, with 
the proliferation of streaming television services like Netflix, Ama-
zon, and Hulu, critics and journalists alike have contended that the 
“streaming series” is a new genre in and of itself due in part to new 
narrative conventions, aesthetic possibilities, and output methods.97 
On that account, the impossibility of predicting the new genre of 
tomorrow does not appear to be losing steam. 
In sum, the scènes à faire doctrine assumes that an artistic or 
literary genre possesses “discrete, persistent, and readily identifiable 
conventions, i.e., devices ‘that flow naturally and necessarily from 
the choice of a given concept.’”98 This assumption, however, does 
not track reality. On the contrary, it has been rightly argued that 
“genre conventions are unstable social constructs that continually 
evolve, arising and disappearing as audience tastes and tempera-
ments change over time.”99 In other words, determining what con-
ventions were standard at one point in time provides slight 
knowledge about the conventions of a different time, even for writ-
ings of identical genres.100 For this reason, courts must evaluate a 
work’s originality at the time of creation, as an author’s perception 
 
 94 See id. at 453–54. 
 95 See id. 
 96 Kelsey Sutton, Analysts Explain What This Year’s Seismic TV Changes 
Mean for 2021, ADWEEK (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.adweek.com/convergent-
tv/analysts-explain-what-this-years-seismic-tv-changes-mean-for-2021/. 
 97 See, e.g., James Poniewozik, Streaming TV Isn’t Just a New Way to Watch. 
It’s a New Genre., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.
com/2015/12/20/arts/television/streaming-tv-isnt-just-a-new-way-to-watch-its-a-
new-genre.html. 
 98 Walker, supra note 16, at 438 (citing Bill Diodato Photography, LLC v. 
Kate Spade, LLC, 388 F. Supp. 2d 382, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
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of genre conventions assuredly evolves alongside a genre’s perpet-
ual transformation.101 
In doing so, a court would reduce the risk of assessing elements 
within the work that indeed pre-dated or post-dated what was 
“stock” or “standard” at the time of creation.102 Relatedly, this tem-
poral framework would ensure that any expert testimony would help 
educate the judge and potentially a jury as to what was truly com-
mon in the industry at that time. Evaluating originality without a 
temporal framework would, more notably, overthrow the goal of re-
warding an author’s ingenuity.103 This belief makes intuitive sense: 
an infringing work that becomes popular should not be permitted to 
use the scènes à faire doctrine as a sword against what was once 
original singular expression. 
III. A DISNEY FRANCHISE: THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE SCÈNES À 
FAIRE DOCTRINE DEMONSTRATED 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Alfred v. Walt Disney Co.104 val-
idates the contention that the lack of a sound temporal framework 
may ultimately lead to an inequitable result based on an inapposite 
justification for how or why certain elements are scènes à faire. Cur-
rent and future analytical methods would benefit immensely from 
an ex-ante author-drafted supplement that details the complexities 
of how a genre’s conventions were used in a work at the time of 
creation.105 
A. A Writer’s Dream Come True 
In October 1999, Tova Laiter introduced screenwriters Arthur 
Lee Alfred II (“Alfred”) and Ezequiel Martinez, Jr. (“Martinez”) to 
Brigham Taylor (“Taylor”), Josh Harmon (“Harmon”), and Michael 
Haynes (“Haynes”) at the Walt Disney Company (“Disney”).106 
 
 101 See generally id. 
 102 See generally Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 388 F. Supp. 3d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 
2019). 
 103 See Schwartz et. al, supra note 8, at 12. 
 104 See 821 F. App’x 727, 729 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 105 See infra Part V.B. 
 106 Appellants’ Corrected Opening Brief at 1, Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., No. 
19-55669, 2019 WL 4889768, at *1 (9th Cir. 2020). 
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Thereafter, Alfred and Martinez presented an original screenplay 
Red Hood to Taylor, Harmon, and Haynes (together, the “Disney 
Creative Team”).107 While collaborating with the Disney Creative 
Team on Red Hood, Alfred and Martinez alleged that they devel-
oped a new idea for an original screenplay entitled Pirates of the 
Spanish Main.108 Prior to pitching the film to Disney, Alfred and 
Martinez retitled their screenplay Pirates of the Caribbean, which 
was the name of a theme park ride at Disneyland.109 Alfred and Mar-
tinez alleged that the title was an “inspired” change because the 
“name of the Disney Ride . . . had no story.”110 The final draft, 
which centered on an “original supernatural element of a story about 
a rivalry between pirates,” was submitted to Taylor on August 9, 
2000.111 
Weeks passed without correspondence from Taylor as to 
whether Disney was at all interested in the screenplay.112 Alfred and 
Martinez claimed that during a creative meeting concerning Red 
Hood, the Pirates of the Caribbean screenplay was visible in Tay-
lor’s office along with artwork that Alfred and Martinez had pro-
vided.113 According to the two screenwriters, upon mentioning the 
screenplay, they “were quickly ushered out of Taylor’s office.”114 
After returning to Taylor’s office a “short time later, all materials 
that been on the coffee table had been removed and the meeting 
ended abruptly.”115 
On November 26, 2002, the Pirates of the Caribbean screenplay 
was finally returned to Martinez via U.S.P.S Priority Mail.116 The 
first Pirates of the Caribbean film, Pirates of the Caribbean: The 
Curse of the Black Pearl,117 would go onto premiere some seven 
 
 107 Id. at *1–2. 
 108 Id. at *2. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at *3. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of the Black Pearl was released in 
3,416 theatres and ultimately grossed US $654,264,015. Pirates of the Caribbean: 
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months later, on July 9, 2003.118 Upon viewing the blockbuster hit, 
it was clear to Alfred, Martinez, and Laiter that there were substan-
tial similarities between their original screenplay and the film.119 
B. Sunk by the District Court 
Alfred, Martinez, and Laiter brought suit against “The Walt Dis-
ney Company, et al. in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Colorado on November 14, 2017.”120 The case was then 
transferred on September 18, 2018, to the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California.121 Nearly two months 
later, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss.122 Thereafter, Judge 
Consuelo B. Marshall applied the extrinsic test by assessing the “ar-
ticulable similarities between the plot, themes, dialogue, mood, set-
ting, pace, characters and sequence of events” in the parties’ 
works.123 In so doing, the court noted the well settled precept of cop-
yright law: “[s]cenes-à-faire, or situations and incidents that flow 
necessarily or naturally from a basic plot premise, cannot sustain a 
finding of infringement.”124 As detailed below, the court ultimately 
found that the works were “not substantially similar as a matter of 
law.”125 
First, Judge Marshall concluded that the single claimed similar-
ity as to the plot of the screenplays—“supernatural ‘cursed’ pirates 
or ‘skull faced’ pirates”—was scènes à faire.126 Unfortunately, the 
judge did not give any reasoning as to why. However, Disney did 
state in their Answering Brief that “‘[s]upernatural pirates’ are 
scènes à faire for pirate works (appearing in countless works, from 
Richard Wagner’s 1843 opera The Flying Dutchman to William 
Hope Hodgson’s 1909 [novel] The Ghost Pirates) and are a key 
 
The Curse of the Black Pearl, BOX OFFICE MOJO, https://www.boxof-
ficemojo.com/release/rl4134045185/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2021). 
 118 Appellants’ Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 106, at *3. 
 119 Id. at *3–4. 
 120 Id. at *7. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 388 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1183 (C.D. Cal. 2019). 
 124 Id. at 1181 (citations omitted). 
 125 See id. at 1190. 
 126 Id. at 1183. 
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element of the Pirates of the Caribbean Ride.”127 Even so, “a new 
treatment of a common subject may be protected by copyright,”128 
and while Disney did identify specific works to demonstrate that a 
particular element has been previously presented in literature and 
theatre, it remains to be seen as to whether that is sufficient for a 
finding of generic stock.129 Moreover, the absence of any analysis 
measuring how prevalent these elements are in modern works, along 
with the fact that the novel and opera were 109 and 175 years old,130 
respectively, leads to a reasonable inference that the court did not 
necessarily look to what was truly standard or stock when the Plain-
tiffs’ screenplay was written. 
Next, Judge Marshall assessed the Plaintiffs’ contention that the 
works were similar because they both included, “treasure maps, 
ghost ships, the ‘undead,’ the supernatural, ships flying black sails, 
skeletons, privateers, naval attacks, dark fog, the ‘pirate code,’ 
ghosts, and sea monsters.”131 He reasoned that the elements were 
unprotectable because they were “familiar stock scenes, and charac-
teristics that flow naturally from the works’ shared basic plot prem-
ise” about pirates.132 In other words, the elements were scènes à 
faire.133 Upon contrasting the main characters in the works, all sim-
ilarities—ranging from cockiness, bravery, and drunkenness,134 to 
wearing dark pirate clothing and having facial hair135—were found 
by the court to be generic and unprotectable.136 The similar themes 
between the works (mutiny and betrayal and a prologue that occurs 
ten years prior to the main story) and the similarities in mood (“dark 
scenes involving pirate battles and sea monsters”), along with 
 
 127 Appellees’ Answering Brief at 27, Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., No. 19-
55669, 2019 WL 749605, at *27 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 128 Universal Pictures v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 
1947) (“Copying and infringement may exist, although the work of the pirate is 
so cleverly done that no identity of language can be found in the two works.”). 
 129 See Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 127, at *27. 
 130 See id. 
 131 Walt Disney Co., 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1183. 
 132 Id. at 1183. 
 133 See generally Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 821 F. App’x 727, 729 (9th Cir. 
2020). 
 134 Walt Disney Co., 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1185. 
 135 Id. at 1186. 
 136 Id. at 1185. 
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similarities in setting (ships, port towns, and the Caribbean gener-
ally), were held unprotectable because they all flowed “naturally 
from unprotectable basic plot premises” concerning pirates.137 
C. Set Afloat by the Ninth Circuit 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the screenplay 
shared sufficient similarities with the film to survive a motion to 
dismiss, as the selection and arrangement of the similarities was 
“more than de minimis.”138 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the dis-
trict court’s dismissal of the action mainly rested upon the belief that 
similar elements were “unprotected generic, pirate-movie 
tropes.”139 For that reason, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the dis-
trict court’s conclusion because  
“expert testimony would aid in determining whether 
the similarities Plaintiffs identify are qualitatively 
significant[,] . . .  [which would be] useful in this cir-
cumstance, where the works in question are almost 
twenty years old[,] and the blockbuster Pirates of the 
Caribbean film franchise may itself have shaped 
what are now considered pirate-movie tropes.”140 
Despite the recognition that expert testimony would be helpful, 
the Ninth Circuit did not expressly clarify what the appropriate tem-
poral framework is or should be for applying the scènes à faire doc-
trine to screenplays.141 Courts should evaluate what was standard 
and existing when the author wrote the screenplay. As demonstrated 
in this Comment, the work’s elements that may have been unique 
and inventive in 1999 could in fact be the genre tropes of present 
day.142 If courts applied the scènes à faire doctrine by focusing on 
the genre tropes existing at the time of litigation, which it appears 
the district court in Alfred v. Walt Disney Co. may have done, the 
incentive to create original works will be discouraged.143 For 
 
 137 Id. at 1187–89. 
 138 Alfred, 821 F. App’x at 729. 
 139 See id. 
 140 See id. 
 141 See generally id. at 729. 
 142 See supra Part III.B. 
 143 See Schwartz et. al, supra note 8, at 12. 
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instance, if an infringer’s screenplay becomes commercially suc-
cessful as to define the modern tropes of that genre, a scènes à faire 
analysis that assesses the existence of present genre tropes to deter-
mine if the original copyrighted screenplay is “common or stock” 
produces an illogical “scenario in which the copyrighted work loses 
its value by” the infringing work becoming successful and widely 
adopted.144 
Similarly, if a copyrighted screenplay becomes widely clichéd 
upon its success, a scènes à faire inquiry that evaluates the existence 
of current genre tropes to decide if the original copyrighted screen-
play is “common or stock” creates an irrational situation whereby 
the copyrighted work loses its value by becoming popular and ex-
tensively adopted.145 To what extent should a creator’s copyrighted 
work become so popular that the work itself converts to scènes à 
faire?146 Put differently, does it make sense to have a rule that works 
can become scènes à faire merely on the basis of their own popular-
ity?147 Indeed, this perverse scenario would likely stymy the incen-
tives for creating original works.148 
IV. PATENT LAW PRINCIPLES PRESENT A WORKABLE SOLUTION 
TO A NECESSARY BUT FLAWED DOCTRINE 
The chief ambition of the American patent system is to encour-
age innovation, as demonstrated in the Constitution’s articulation of 
Congress’s power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their . . . Writings and Discoveries.”149 The patent system 
stimulates advancement by “rewarding inventors with a time-lim-
ited exclusive patent right for taking two steps they likely would not 
otherwise take: to invent in the first instance and to reveal 
 
 144 See id. 
 145 See id. 
 146 Cendali, supra note 7, at 417. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See Schwartz et. al, supra note 8, at 12. 
 149 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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information to the public about these inventions, thereby enriching 
society with the invention and the ability to build on the inven-
tion.”150 
A. The Specification and Obviousness 
As a general matter, modern patents contain both a specification 
and a set of claims.151 The patent’s claims are located at the conclu-
sion of the patent document; this portion sets forth the legal bound-
aries through articulating “precisely what it is that the inventor 
wants to prevent others from making, using, or selling.”152 The spec-
ification is a description in words and illustrations of what the in-
vention is, how it works, what complications it aims to resolve, and 
what distinguishes it from what existed previously.153 The opening 
paragraph of section 112 of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112, pro-
vides that the specification “shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in 
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person 
skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the 
same . . . .”154 
In the seminal case of Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit pro-
vided that “[c]laims define and circumscribe,” whereas “the written 
description discloses and teaches.”155 And so, the specification is 
best understood as the part of the patent application that educates in 
words and pictures as to what the invention is, and how it differs 
from the prior art references.156 In other words, a commonsense as-
sessment of the written description should indicate whether the in-
ventor is the one responsible for the underlying contribution as the 
description should illuminate the invention’s distinguishable 
 
 150 Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 
731 (2009). 
 151 Andres Sawicki, The Central Claiming Renaissance, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 
645, 653 (2018). 
 152 Id. at 653–54. 
 153 Id. at 653. 
 154 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2020). 
 155 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (en banc). 
 156 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2020). 
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features from what society already knew.157 From the vantage point 
of the Federal Circuit, the written description inquiry should confirm 
whether “the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.”158 
The other demand, known as the enablement requirement, necessi-
tates “that the specification teach a skilled artisan how to make and 
use the claimed invention.”159 However, “in practice[,] the enable-
ment and written description requirements are basically coexten-
sive.”160 
Although patentable inventions are frequently difficult or expen-
sive to describe and define clearly, the patent system’s inclusion of 
a specification requirement provides inspiration for a possible solu-
tion to the failings of the scènes à faire doctrine.161 A copyright ver-
sion of the written description requirement could afford a platform 
for applicants to explain the essential “objective” elements and fea-
tures of their invention, i.e., original screenplay or teleplay.162 This 
perspective reveals a better way for copyright registration to func-
tion: to allow creators to distinguish and assert fundamental ele-
ments for determining scènes à faire at the time of creation. 
The appropriateness of anchoring the scènes à faire inquiry to 
the date when the copyrighted work was made likewise finds sup-
port in the arena of patent law, specifically its obviousness in-
quiry.163 In the patent law context, courts resolve the validity of a 
claimed invention by “cast[ing] the mind back to the time the inven-
tion was made” to determine whether the invention was obvious.164 
To that end, patent law cautiously warns against using the phrase “is 
obvious” because it “improperly focuses on the present” and “may 
also lead to an improper approach in which the judge determines 
whether the invention is presently obvious.”165 All in all, allowing 
creators to characterize and proclaim fundamental elements at the 
 
 157 Sawicki, supra note 151, at 686. 
 158 Ariad Pharms., Inc., 598 F.3d at 1351. 
 159 Sawicki, supra note 151, at 719. 
 160 Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 
NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1113 (2011). 
 161 See Fromer, supra note 150, at 755. 
 162 See id. 
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 164 In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). 
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time of (or in close proximity to) creation would aide courts in de-
termining scènes à faire and, subsequently, substantial similarity by 
effectively providing a temporal window to the author’s perceived 
originality and genre landscape when the work was made. 
* * * * 
Before turning to this Comment’s proposed solution, it is useful 
to briefly view the different claiming approaches and application re-
quirements of patent and copyright law. Balancing these approaches 
against each other illuminates the underpinning principles inspiring 
this Comment’s proposal of a “written supplement”—an extra-tex-
tual inclusion to be made available at the time of copyright registra-
tion. 
B. Claiming Systems of Patent Law and Copyright Law 
Copyright law has a procedure of “central claiming by exem-
plar,” requiring the delivery only of an ideal member of the set of 
protected works in tangible form,166 e.g., a completed screenplay. 
Copyright protection then extends past the copyrighted work itself 
to substantially similar works—that is, “a set of works to be enu-
merated only down the road”167 in the event of infringement litiga-
tion. There, the author’s work is used as the prototype against which 
all purportedly infringing works are compared to determine “if they 
share sufficient salient characteristics to fall within the scope of the 
copyright holder’s rights.”168 
Hence, one can view the copyright system as not requiring “for-
mal claims[,]” as the work itself is “protectable immediately upon 
fixation.”169 Consequently, the timing of copyright claiming mani-
fests relatively late, and claims can be tactically fashioned to suit the 
contours of certain disputes.170 Because the characteristics of the 
claimants’ work and its precise periphery are not further specified 
until, and unless, there is copyright litigation, claiming can be ad-
vantageously directed to cover the defendant’s allegedly infringing 
 
 166 Fromer, supra note 150, at 721. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark P. McKenna, Claiming Design, 167 U. PA. L. 
REV. 123, 161 (2018). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at 169. 
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works.171 Unlike patent law registrations, copyright applications are 
not deeply assessed, nor do they contain any critical information 
about the claimed aspects of the copyrighted work.172 Rather, the 
registrations for copyright are comprised largely of “administrative 
data like information about the registrant, the work’s title, its com-
pletion date, and publication date (if any).”173 For the majority of 
works generated after 1977, the copyright endures for the author’s 
lifetime plus seventy years,174 whereas the life of a patent generally 
spans a twenty-year term.175 
Patent law has often embraced a system of peripheral claiming 
in which patentees must thoroughly articulate their invention’s outer 
bounds, typically by providing its “necessary and sufficient charac-
teristics.”176 In addition to peripheral claiming, patent law has also 
embraced central claiming approaches.177 There, the scope of the 
patent is measured by “the contribution the inventor made to the 
art.”178 In a central claiming patent analysis, the specification’s com-
prehensive explanation of what the inventor did, rather than merely 
“the language used in the claims at the end of the patent,” forms the 
basis and focus of the patentable subject matter inquiry.179 
In the context of this Comment’s proposed written supplement, 
patent law’s central claiming dogma lays a functional groundwork 
for the proposal’s utility because “it demands a case-by-case analy-
sis of the proximity between the inventor’s contribution and some 
object of inquiry.”180 Contribution, in this sense, relates to the prin-
ciple that in a central claiming patent analysis, the specification’s 
inclusive description necessitates that parties identify the more ger-
mane characteristics in an exemplar.181 In this light, the potential 
form and substance of  “central claiming by exemplar” in copyright 
law is more akin to peripheral claiming, whereby claims can be 
 
 171 Id. at 162. 
 172 Id. at 161. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. at 160. 
 175 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2020). 
 176 Fromer, supra note 150, at 719. 
 177 Sawicki, supra note 151, at 649. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. at 683. 
 181 See Fromer & McKenna, supra note 168, at 186–87. 
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written with greater ambiguity to make them broader and strategi-
cally overinclusive.182 And so, the proposal strives—in part—to 
provide a copyright claiming methodology, which upon implemen-
tation would diminish the opportunity for “strategic behavior that 
can lead to a free-for-all in copyright claiming.”183  
V. DECONSTRUCTING A SCREENPLAY OR TELEPLAY 
Some commentators have sought a “bookshelf rule”184 as a 
scènes à faire remedy that requires a court to establish a work’s 
genre and consider its conventions after reviewing a modified cop-
yright registration, whereby “claimants also provide bibliographic 
information that identifies comparable works already in the collec-
tion of the Library of Congress.”185 Nevertheless, notwithstanding 
the scènes à faire doctrine’s limitations, this would be a misstep, as 
it fails to utilize what most authors possess to write a screenplay or 
teleplay: a comprehensive, detailed compilation of not only title ref-
erences, but also images, notes, designs, and descriptions regarding 
their work and the many elements comprising it.186 That is not to 
say that the sole inclusion of an author’s inspirational title references 
would not aid a court’s assessment of scènes à faire. However, with-
out more concrete specificity regarding the various expressive ele-
ments of a screenplay, a court’s search for substantial similarity may 
still fall victim to an overly broad classification or misguided con-
ception of an author’s work. 
A. A Work’s Development: The Writer’s Reality 
The ease of completing a thorough disclosure that teaches one 
about the tangible work is anything but onerous for serious appli-
cants. Therefore, the copyright registration procedure ought to adopt 
 
 182 See Sawicki, supra note 151, at 685 (“[A shift to] central claiming 
can . . . be understood as a . . . preemptive response to potential overinclusive-
ness.”). 
 183 Fromer & McKenna, supra note 168, at 162. 
 184 Walker, supra note 16, at 468. 
 185 Id. 
 186 See, e.g., Jason Hellerman, How Do Professional Screenwriters Outline 
Their Projects?, NO FILM SCHOOL (May 8, 2020), https://nofilmschool.com/pro-
fessional-outline. 
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a requirement inspired by the objectives underpinning patent law’s 
specification requirement.187 Under the current copyright system, 
artists and writers are forced to “define” and “describe” their works 
upon litigation commencing.188 Such defining or describing mani-
fests through the creator asserting crucial elements for determining 
substantial similarity or defining “the heart of the work for ascer-
taining fair use.”189 This suggests that a writer’s ability to demarcate 
their creations, while not necessarily an activity approached without 
reluctance, is possible. 
Of course, many who believe their screenplay has been stolen 
are in fact “victims of synchronicity, not plagiarism,”190 and the co-
incidence of any screenplay’s element is exacerbated when the sim-
ilarity is seen in finished form on the big screen or television set. 
Thus, a concern lies in an author’s ex post characterizations as a de-
bated work’s artistic and commercial effect on the world may be 
unscrupulously incorporated into the work’s depiction in litiga-
tion.191 Because litigation always commences sometime after the 
work’s creation, regardless of the creator’s intent, the effect of a 
work onto the marketplace may change what is alleged as protected 
expression or not.192 Given the task’s complexity and potential for 
hindsight bias,193 examination of a copyright claim in this fashion 
does not adequately assess copyright validity, that is, the actual orig-
inality of the claim itself may be skewed. Rather, administrative ex 
ante mechanisms should be in place to aide courts in determining 
scènes à faire and ultimately substantial similarity. 
What some commentators have overlooked, especially in the 
context of screenplays and teleplays, is that authors: (1) must virtu-
ally always utilize a “pitch deck” or “lookbook” when attempting to 
sell a feature film screenplay or raise finances to make a feature 
 
 187 See supra Part IV. 
 188 Fromer, supra note 150, at 790. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Gladden, supra note 9, at 383. 
 191 Fromer, supra note 150, at 790. 
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 193 See Liz McKenzie, Comment, Drawing Lines: Addressing Cognitive Bias 
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film,194 and (2) must more than likely have a “series bible” to sell 
and market a pilot television script.195 A film “pitch deck” allows 
authors to share two narratives to a potential financier or production 
company.196 On the one hand, it presents the characters and story of 
the film, while, on the other hand, it allows the author to detail their 
inspiration and overriding vision.197 There, a film’s author fre-
quently will provide comparable film projects—both creatively and 
budgetarily.198 In addition, the “pitch deck” will habitually include 
the exact genre of the screenplay.199 This defining of genre is cru-
cial; for instance, if the film is described as within the horror genre, 
potential financiers would likely want to assess if the script invokes 
feelings of fear, dread, and terror.200 Beyond this, the visual ele-
ments included aim to express the spirit and essence of the film—it 
is here that the genre’s aesthetic convention may also be ascer-
tained.201 Within the realm of fiction publishing, a budding author 
will commonly provide publishers with a query letter to hopefully 
catch an editor’s attention.202 The content of a query letter is not 
materially dissimilar to the substance of a film’s pitch deck, except 
for the fact that a query letter is not accompanied by tonal im-
agery.203 
In the context of television (i.e., teleplays), a “series bible” will 
typically include a series logline, the genre of the show, comparable 
 
 194 See Meredith Alloway, On Decks: The Art (and Necessity) of the Independ-
ent Film Lookbook, FILMMAKER MAG. (Mar. 14, 2019), https://filmmakermaga-
zine.com/107189-on-deck/#.X_SUrmRKgUY. 
 195 See Valerie Kalfrin, How to Create the Perfect Show Bible, SCREENCRAFT 
(May 8, 2017), https://screencraft.org/2017/05/08/create-perfect-show-bible/. 
 196 See Nick Sadler, What is a Pitch Deck and Why Should You Create One?, 
SCRIPT MAG. (Jul. 18, 2018), https://scriptmag.com/features/what-is-a-pitch-
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 198 See Adam Blakemore, Perfect Pitch: What a Pitch Can Do for Your Indie 
Film Project, RAINDANCE (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.raindance.org/perfect-
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MASTERCLASS, https://www.masterclass.com/articles/how-to-pitch-your-book-
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show references, detailed character biographies for all main charac-
ters, and episodic summaries for the entire first season.204 Often, a 
thorough series bible will provide summaries for future seasons, 
along with an explanation of how the show will conclude.205 Other 
elements regarding pacing, themes, and visual style or mood will be 
set out in the document.206 Essentially anything established on 
screen will likely have been reflected in the series bible in some 
way.207 
B. The Written Supplement 
Just as the Supreme Court in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. sought 
review of a patent’s specification as a way to inform the meaning of 
a claim and subsequent invention, here too, a written supplement 
offered at the time of registration will afford a court valuable insight 
into the circumstances surrounding a work’s formation at the time 
of creation.208 As mentioned,209 a court’s application of an extrinsic 
analysis to determine substantial similarity among the parties’ works 
typically assesses “the plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, 
characters, and sequence of events,” and, therefore, a court may pre-
clude scènes à faire elements at all said junctures.210 Since many 
authors have established these different guiding facets of a given 
work—more than likely prior to copyright registration and certainly 
prior to litigation—these elements weigh heavily in the construction 
of the individual segments of the proposed written supplement.211 
Accordingly, the written supplement submission for literary and 
dramatic works, namely screenplays, teleplays, novels, and theatri-
cal plays, should include six basic categories: (1) Genre; (2) Plot; 
 
 204 See generally Ken Miyamoto, 21 Series Bibles That Every TV Screenwriter 
Should Read, SCREENCRAFT (Aug. 12, 2019), https://screencraft.org/2019/08/
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Cir. 2010). 
 209 See supra Section II.A. 
 210 See, e.g., Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 388 F. Supp. 3d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 
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(3) Character; (4) Theme; (5) Setting; and (6) Mood and Pace. Al-
though literary works differ from works of the performing arts (i.e., 
screenplays, teleplays, and theatrical plays) in that they are solely 
intended to be read, these categories are inherently a part of these 
mediums of expression.212 
While there may be apprehension about the cost and viability of 
the administrative and legal support necessary to institute such an 
inclusion, this proposal does not seek to implement an ex ante ex-
amination of copyright claims. Instead, this proposal will provide 
vital guidance to a court regarding a copyright’s validity, only 
should there be later litigation regarding copyright infringement. 
This result is beneficial, in large part, because the supplementary 
materials would indeed reflect the artistic view of the author’s orig-
inality at the time of creation.213 Although it is certainly imaginable 
that film studios would work with lawyers to create a robust written 
supplement, it is also plausible that a capable writer could success-
fully complete a supplement without the assistance of a legal team. 
As a result, completing the proposed supplement would not always 
be a costly endeavor, and therefore, the supplement would not deter 
creation. Nonetheless, the specification inspired disclosure would 
demand that the author’s inclusion be in “full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art”214 to which 
the creation pertains to garner understanding and appreciation of the 
author’s envisioned work. This ask finds an analog in patent law’s 
enablement requirement because effective “series bibles” and “pitch 
decks” are given to collaborators to help in producing and making 
the product with the creator.215 
In the end, the problem of copyright seeker overreaching would 
largely be diminished in light of the supplement demonstrating the 
writer’s perception of the work’s many elements at the approximate 
time of registration.216 To reduce the potential that the written sup-
plement was dishonestly created to advantageously support a party’s 
 
 212 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 213 Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2020). 
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 215 See Kalfrin, supra note 195. 
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interests, this proposal contends that the supplement should be sub-
mitted at the time of registration. This proposal leaves open a future 
scenario where a copyright infringement action could proceed be-
tween a new work (accompanied by the written supplement) and an 
older work (not accompanied by the written supplement). Under this 
scenario, a court should still strive to employ a scènes à faire analy-
sis that assesses if the disputed work was original or whether it was 
standard or stock when the author created the work.217 
Although some writers may renounce this supplement out of fear 
of having their “magic recipe” known, it should be stressed that this 
supplement would not only be discovered as a means to support lit-
igation but would also serve to provide effective notice to the public 
of a set of protected embodiments or rights. In any event, such an 
overbearing want for secrecy is arguably misplaced. One only needs 
to turn their attention to Quentin Tarantino’s words during the re-
lease of his debut film Reservoir Dogs.218 In describing his inspira-
tion, Tarantino stated, “I didn’t go out of my way to do a rip-off of 
‘The Killing,’ but I did think of it as my ‘Killing,’ my take on that 
kind of heist movie.”219 He furthered divulged, “Although it’s not 
exactly ‘Rashomon,’ you do get a sense of the characters’ different 
perspectives when they talk about what happened.”220 
1. GENRE 
As demonstrated, some writers craft genre-bending pieces that 
may leave courts unable to properly classify a work into an applica-
ble genre.221 At a minimum, this inclusion will allow an author’s 
conception of their work and the genre or genres in which it falls 
under to be precisely matched.222 Rather than relying solely on 
 
 217 See supra Part III.C. 
 218 John Hartl, ‘Dogs’ Gets Walkouts and Raves, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 29, 
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courts to determine the conventions within a certain genre, and then 
ascertain which of these conventions are shared with the work,223 
this section of the supplement will seek the author’s exacting genre 
classification, along with specific genre reference titles and inspira-
tional films. Furthermore, this segment will afford the author an op-
portunity to provide a thorough understanding of whether a subver-
sive or expressive treatment of genre tropes or stock elements have 
been built into the work. 
Like patent law’s specification requirement, whereby an inven-
tor distinguishes their invention from what existed previously,224 
this segment of the inclusion empowers authors to distinguish their 
new writing from particular genre titles. This offers authors a way 
to characterize what elements are in fact scènes à faire. Some may 
fear that this approach may result in an underinclusive depiction; 
however, the innate connection between all of the supplement’s el-
ements would make it difficult to mislead without misstep.225 Nev-
ertheless, taken together, these inclusions would bring greater clar-
ity as to what genre conventions and elements, if any, were intended 
and utilized in the work at the time of creation. 
2. PLOT 
Defined as “the plan of events in a screenplay,” plot is equiva-
lently understood as the cause-and-effect relationship amongst 
events in a screenplay.226 It is this unique arrangement of events that 
aggregates to expression.227 With greater frequency than any other 
noted element, a screenplay’s plot initiates the bulk of copyright in-
fringement actions.228 Analogous to the other elements of a screen-
play, sufficiently demonstrating “substantial similarity in plot 
hinges upon the idea/expression dichotomy.”229 The extrinsic test 
 
work is likely to be less harmful overall than leaving the classification undeter-
mined until litigation arises.”). 
 223 Id. at 467. 
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centers “not [on] the basic plot ideas for stories,” which are not 
shielded by copyright law, but on “the actual concrete elements that 
make up the total sequence of events and the relationships between 
the major characters.”230 Thus, a court may define plot as a sequence 
of events by which an author expresses their ideas and theme.231 
This means that even scenes that are not distinctive or well-defined 
can be rendered substantially similar if they advance in a similar 
fashion or pattern within the two screenplays.232 That said, the pat-
tern may be found to be unprotectable scènes à faire if it is not suf-
ficiently tangible or “concrete.”233 
When a writer “plots,” he or she partakes in the art of creating 
relationships between scenes, juxtaposing them to make the story 
points more potent and momentous.234 In so doing, a writer turns the 
story’s structural considerations that concern conflict and meaning 
into (hopefully) dynamic moments that “convey exposition, build 
suspense, reveal character[,] and expose emotion” to strengthen the 
audience’s immersion in the world of the story.235 Often, the type of 
dramatic question presented by a screenplay dictates the plot and 
informs what kind of story it will be.236 To that end, many have held 
that a definite number of plot ideas exist—some set that number at 
seven,237 others at twenty-nine.238 Because it is impossible to predict 
how plot issues may manifest in an infringement action, the most 
reasonable demand is that writers attempt to render their stories into 
one of the known tenets of plot ideas.239 In that event, a court will 
be more faithfully guided in its assessment of whether “incidents, 
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characters[,] and settings” are, as a “practical matter[,] indispensa-
ble, or at least standard, in the treatment” of that plot idea.240 More-
over, this understanding will especially aide courts when wrestling 
with a screenplay whose plot and genre pairing is arguably atypical; 
for instance, coming-of-age horror films, e.g., Carrie.241 
3. CHARACTER 
Although there is not a specific test for comparing and con-
trasting two characters, a very useful way to assess two characters is 
by scrutinizing character background, personal attributes, and moti-
vation.242 A well-rounded supplement would consider all three of 
these elements for its main character(s).243 This element overlaps 
with the element of plot as a character’s background and specific 
motivation informs where a character “has been and where he [or 
she] is trying to go.”244 The less specific, transcendent, and dynamic 
a character is, the greater the chance that that character or character-
istics will be found to be unprotectable scènes à faire.245 That said, 
differences in the traits and personalities of the major characters op-
erating in a substantially similar plot may be enough for the infringer 
to escape liability.246 
4. THEME 
Although there is some intersection between plot, theme, and 
mood, each is a distinct and inimitable element of expression that 
merits individual analysis.247 Still, this masks a deeper complexity, 
which demonstrates its utility within the written supplement: theme 
is a great tool to separate similar plots from one other.248 That is, it 
is extremely doubtful that two screenplays are going to have “sub-
stantially similar plots, yet maintain substantially different 
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themes.”249 As a general proposition, if the two themes are indeed 
substantially different, the plot similarities are likely “not concrete” 
and consist only of the same common or generic ideas, i.e., scènes 
à faire.250 
Even so, a concern may arise as to whether the described theme 
and its characteristics could capture the work’s artistic essence.251 
One thing that might ameliorate this concern is that a director, in the 
course of preparing a film for festival release and subsequent distri-
bution, often will provide a director’s statement to the public.252 The 
director’s statement is a written description in which the director ex-
plains the themes, vision, and inspiration for the film.253 For exam-
ple, when it was announced that Jim Jarmusch’s film Only Lovers 
Left Alive would be presented in competition at the Cannes Film 
Festival, this director’s statement was released: 
Only Lovers Left Alive is an unconventional love 
story between a man and a woman, Adam and Eve. 
(My script was partially inspired by the last book 
published by Mark Twain: The Diaries of Adam and 
Eve—though no direct reference to the book is made 
other than the character’s names.) 
These two lovers are archetypal outsiders, classic bo-
hemians, extremely intelligent and sophisticated—
yet still in full possession of their animal instincts. 
They have traveled the world and experienced many 
remarkable things, always inhabiting the shadowed 
margins of society. And, like their own love story, 
their particular perspective on human history spans 
centuries—because they happen to be vampires. 
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But this is not your usual vampire story. Set in the 
very distinct cities of Detroit and Tangier, and taking 
place almost entirely at night, Adam and Eve must 
have human blood to survive. But they now live in 
the world of the 21st century where biting the neck 
of a stranger would be reckless and regressive—for 
survival, they must be certain the blood that sustains 
them is pure and free of disease or contamination. 
And, almost like shadows, they have learned long 
ago to deftly avoid the attention of any authorities. 
For our film, the vampire is a resonant metaphor––a 
way to frame the deeper intentions of the story. This 
is a love story, but also the story of two exceptional 
outsiders who, given their unusual circumstances, 
have a vast overview of human and natural history, 
including stunning achievements and tragic and bru-
tal failures. Adam and Eve are themselves metaphors 
for the present state of human life––they are fragile 
and endangered, susceptible to natural forces, and to 
the shortsighted behavior of those in power.254 
While only some films brave the festival circuit, the established 
practice of drafting a director’s statement demonstrates that a script-
writer could indeed write, as Jarmusch’s statement reflects, an in-
formative supplement for theme (and plot) that is both succinct and 
effective.255 In fact, it is wholly plausible that a supplement for 
theme may be explored through plot and vice versa. If that be the 
case, each section would disclose an identical written description. 
5. SETTING 
By itself, a physical geographic setting will not typically be a 
protectable element of expression.256 Still, differences in geographic 
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setting between two scripts may themselves speak to larger differ-
ences in plot and theme or may inform a court’s application of the 
scènes à faire doctrine, as the settings may naturally flow from a 
common theme or, conversely, the theme may naturally derive from 
a certain setting.257 Clearly, most script thieves have “enough com-
mon sense”258 to change the geographic setting within a work. Even 
so, the setting category still has significant utility because it warrants 
an author to describe how setting is used within the work.259 For 
example, a “small town” may be used to serve a comedic function 
or a “big town” may help to spotlight a fish-out-of-water story 
line.260 Therefore, the use of setting may illuminate a larger pattern 
of infringement or the existence of scènes à faire.261 Understanding 
how setting is being used will assist courts in analyzing “setting in 
terms of where specific scenes [physically] occur in a screen-
play.”262 Plaintiffs frequently provide a “laundry list of setting com-
mon to both scripts (i.e., both scripts have scenes that take place in 
restaurants, theatres, bars, etc.).”263 Therefore, the “setting” segment 
of the supplement may equally benefit an alleged infringer seeking 
to disprove substantial similarity. If the physical location of these 
“common scene settings” serves no particular function, without sim-
ilarity of dialogue or plot within those locales, a court will likely 
dismiss the settings as generic or scènes à faire and thus, unprotect-
able.264 
6. MOOD AND PACE 
A screenplay’s mood may often dictate the pace, which will help 
a court comprehend how a genre convention is being used in its ap-
plication of the scènes à faire doctrine.265 For example, a more 
thoughtful and reflective mood may give way to a slower paced film, 
indicating that the script is a character-driven drama, whereas a 
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tension-filled rapidly paced film likely demonstrates that the screen-
play is a thriller.266 While the mood of a screenplay is swayed by 
plot and theme, it does stand individually in a court’s analysis as its 
own concrete element of expression—“a combination of the tone 
and feel of the work.”267 Unprotectable similarities in mood may be 
found when these resemblances are common to a given genre.268 At 
the same time, if a plaintiff is unable to demonstrate substantial sim-
ilarity in plot, substantial similarity as to character, theme, and mood 
may adequately demonstrate infringement.269 Notably, the element 
may prove most useful for a plaintiff if they do not succumb to dis-
missal or summary judgment, as “it is ultimately going to fall to a 
jury to determine if the total concept and feel of the two works are 
the same.”270 
VI. CONCLUSION 
At its best, the scènes à faire doctrine ensures that necessary 
scenes or situations and stock elements or plots remain unprotecta-
ble. Yet, at its worst, the scènes à faire doctrine is an expansive and 
subjectively applied bar to protection that may spell disaster for cre-
ative works that feature original expression. My proposal is not a 
remedy that cures all that upsets copyright law’s objective; however, 
a humane compromise is suitable here to balance the competing in-
terests of authors and the active goals of copyright. If a written sup-
plement is to be based in part on section 112 of the Patent Act, it 
should be centered on patent law’s requirement that the “specifica-
tion shall contain a written description of the invention.”271 
To best inform the supplement’s guidelines, the proposal’s dis-
closure considers both a court’s substantial similarity analysis and 
what information an author likely possesses about their own 
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 268 See, e.g., Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 1446, 1451 (9th Cir. 
1988) (concluding that similarities in terms of mood were common to the genre 
of action-adventure television series and movies and therefore did not demon-
strate substantial similarity). 
 269 See Gladden, supra note 9, at 380. 
 270 Id. at 384. 
 271 In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 996 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (emphasis added). 
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work.272 The purpose and applicability of such adequate disclosure 
is as simple as it is beneficial. Satisfaction of the written supplement 
ensures that a tangible fixed work at the time of registration is suf-
ficiently disclosed, so that the elements of protectable expression are 
more distinctly and accurately established by a reviewing court if 
litigation ever commences.273 An adequate description of the tangi-
ble fixed work guards against author overreaching by insisting that 
the work be recounted in detail at the time of registration as to trans-
cend the four corners of the work.274 Thus, an author’s future claims 
and conduct can potentially be shaped by what was truly encom-
passed within his original creation. The fear that an author would 
intentionally categorize or substantiate their work to carve out more 
protective rights is largely displaced due to the demonstrated inter-
play of elements.275 Assuredly, any chicanery by a claimant would 
be readily discerned because the elements and the tangible work it-
self serve as a rational check on what was additionally provided in 
the supplement. 
Legendary film director Robert Altman previously said, “I don’t 
think screenplay writing is the same as writing—I mean, I think it’s 
blueprinting.”276 Indeed, screenplays and teleplays are “literary 
blueprints” on which feature narrative films and television shows 
are based.277 Dissimilar to the novel, where detailed prose fills the 
page and the express direct exploration of theme is possible, screen-
plays and teleplays are written with cinematic and visual description 
to further a story.278 For this reason alone, the very nature of screen-
writing necessitates deep consideration of a supplementary proposal 
to aide courts in determining and understanding similarities from 
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what may be absent or pared-down on the page.279 Although a reg-
istration supplement asking authors to specify extra-textual descrip-
tions and inspirations of new works would be unprecedented as a 
timely procedural mechanism, courts have utilized artists’ state-
ments as evidence in copyright infringement suits, often in fair use 
matters.280 Accordingly, the change would not only be reasonable, 
but it would also serve to promote a more thorough and confident 
review of scènes à faire elements.281 
For now, writers should register their screenplays with the Writ-
ers Guild of America and with the U.S. Copyright Office.282 Writers 
should likewise keep detailed accounts of when and to whom they 
have submitted their written works.283 Because the “line between 
inspiration and unlawful copying is remarkably thin,”284 writers 
should also strive to make their works as distinct as possible.285 As 
a result, the work will become harder for an infringer to misappro-
priate.286 
In the end, copyright registration must empower courts to ven-
ture further in their infringement analyses. Until then, courts will 
continue to be enabled to function as vague identifiers of similari-
ties, potentially masking originality under the guise of the scènes à 
faire doctrine.287 And so, it is time to continue the dialogue on how 
to delicately reform copyright for the modern day—for what is 
standard tomorrow, may not have been today.288 
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